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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT S. NIELSON and ILA DEAN 
NIELSON, 
vs. 
Plaintiffs and 
Appellants, 
CENTRAL WATERWORKS COMPANY, 
a Utah corporation, and the 
STATE OF UTAH, by and through 
its Division of Water 
Resources, 
Defendants and 
Respondents. 
Case No. 17333 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action for a judgment declaring that the as-
sets of a culinary water system, located in the unincorporated 
town of Central, Utah, be administered in conformance with the 
equal protection clauses of the Constitutions of the United 
States and the State of Utah, and for damages stemming from 
a denial of appellants' constitutional rights. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Central Waterworks Company and the State of Utah, by and 
through its Division of water Resources, made separate motions 
for summary judgment against the plaintiffs on July 23, 1980 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
and August 8, 1980, respectively. The motions for summary 
judgment were heard by the District Court on August 20, 1980. 
On August 26, 1980, the Court entered an order granting the 
separate motions for summary judgment of the defendants. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiffs request that the judgments entered below be 
reversed and the matter remanded to the District Court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Robert S. Nielson and Ila Dean Nielson are the owners 
of a parcel of land, approximately 7.acres in size, which 
is situated in the unincorporated town of Central, Utah. 
(R. pp. 1-3, pl. comp.) On or about September 15, 1975, the 
Nielsons, desiring to subdivide the parcel into 18 home sites, 
applied to Central Waterworks Company (hereinafter "Central") 
for the water connections prerequisite to the planned sub-
division. ( R. p. 2). 
Central is a Utah non-profit corporation engaged in 
the business of supplying water to its shareholders in and 
around Central, Utah. (R. pp. 1, 10, 36). In 1952 and again 
in 1973, Central entered into agreements with the State of 
Utah, through its Department of Water Resources or predeces~r 
agency, to construct a culinary water system. (R. PP· 1, 
2, 32, 36, 49, 50, 52). Under those contracts, the State 
financed all or most of the improvements and took title to 
-2-
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all the physical assets, including water rights and easements, 
of Central. Central was allowed to retain beneficial use 
of the system under a repurchase (without interest) agreement. 
(R. pp. 52-54). 
Central denied the Nielsens' application, claiming that 
its water supply was insufficient to service 18 additional 
connections. Investigation by the Nielsens, however, re-
vealed that Central's water supply was more than adequate. 
A renewed application for the connections was denied by Central, 
based on an alleged rule of the company that only one water 
connection would be provided for each acre of property. (R. 
pp. 2, 3). 
A further investigation by plaintiffs revealed that 
Central, while purporting to operate under the "one connec-
tion one acre" rule, had in fact granted connections to ap-
plicants for five parcels of land haying acreages of .91, 
.836, .83, .43, and .21 acres. (R. p. 3). The Nielsens' 
reapplication for water connections was again denied. (R. 
p. 3). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
CENTRAL WATERWORKS' DENIAL OF CONNECTIONS 
TO THE APPELLANTS CONSTITUTES STATE ACTION 
Every cause of action emanating from a violation of a 
person's right to equal protection under the law faces the 
-3-
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threshhold requirement of "state action.• U.S. Const. amend. 
XIV, Sl; Utah Const. art. I, S2. Essentially, the issue is 
one of classification: The acts complained of either consti-
tute state action or they don't. Despite the cut and dried 
appearance of the result, there is no litmus paper test for 
the presence or absence of state action. •only by sifting 
facts and weighing circumstances can the nonobvious involve-
ment of the State in private conduct be attributed its true 
significance.• Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 
U.S. 715, 722, 6 L.Ed.2d 45, 50, 81 s.ct. 856 (1961). 
A. State Action Arises from the "Symbiotic 
Relationship" Between the State and 
Central Waterworks. 
An inquiry into the presence of state action must begin 
with an examination of the relationship between the State 
and the private party. The leading United States Supreme 
Court case on this question, Burton v. Wilmington Parking 
Authority, supra, provides some insight in its delineation 
of some of the factors which indicate state action. In 
Burton, the court found state action where a restaurant 
located in a state-owned parking garage practiced racial 
discrimination. 
Initially, the court in Burton found it important that 
the restaurant was an integral part of the state's plan to 
The provide financially self-sustaining parking garages. 
Wilmington Parking Authority had leased space to a segre-
-4-
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gated restaurant as a means of financing its parking garage. 
In short, the restaurant was seen as a tool of the Authority 
for achieving its "essential governmental functions." Id. 
at 723, 6 L.Ed.2d at 51. 
Similarly, the State of Utah, through its Department of 
water Resources, has used Central Waterworks and others 
similarly situated as an integral part of a statutory scheme 
aimed at promoting efficient use of available water resources. 
Utah Code Ann. §73-10-1, et~· (1953). §73-10-1(3) esta-
blishes the policy "that water, as the property of the public, 
should be so managed by the public that it can be put to 
the highest use for public benefit." Pursuant to this policy 
and other provisions of the Act, the State financed the vast 
majority of the two projects, taking legal title to the com-
pany's physical assets until such time as Central Waterworks 
repurchased the projects. It should also be noted that the 
sums advanced by the State were subject to repayment without 
interest. 
State ownership of the assets of a private party has 
been held to be a strong indication of the presence of state 
action. In Burton, state ownership of the parking garage 
was cited by the court as one of the controlling factors. 
Id. at 723, 6 L.Ed.2d at 51. Furthermore, the court noted 
that the parking authority could have required the restau-
rant, through its lease, "to discharge the responsibilities 
-5-
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under the Fourteenth Amendment imposed upon the private ente~ 
prise as a consequence of state participation. But no state 
may effectively abdicate its responsibilities by either ig-
noring them or failing to discharge them whatever the mot~e 
may be." Id. at 725, 6 L.Ed.2d at 52. In short, the State 
of Utah has an affirmative obligation to insure that property 
owned by the State is operated within the bounds of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 
In Holodnak v. Avco Corporation, 514 F.2d 285 (2d Cir. 
1975), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1013, 46 L.Ed.2d 123, 96 S.Ct. 
188 ( 1975), the discharge of an employee of a defense contrac-
tor for allegedly publishing an article critical of his em-
ployer was held to be state action. The land upon which 
Avco's plant was built, as well as the buildings and most 
of the machinery, were owned by the United States. In addi-
tion, both the government and Avco benefitted from the opera-
tion of the plant. Under such circumstances, the Second 
Circuit held that the employee's discharge was state action. 
Many of the factors which the Second Circuit considered 
important in Holodnak are present in the instant case. For 
example, the State of Utah owns the physical assets of 
Central Waterworks, thus indicating a special relationship 
between the defendants. Moreover, state ownership of physical 
assets used by a private party carries with it the obliga-
tion of insuring that the state's property is administered 
-6-
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in a nondiscriminatory fashion. Burton v. Wilmington Parking 
Authority, 365 U.S. at 725, 6 L.Ed.2d at 52. 
The issue of state action is also discussed in Janusaitis 
v. Middlebury Volunteer Fire Department, 607 F.2d 17 (2d Cir. 
1979), where the level and kind of State involvement are 
similar to the instant case. In Janusaitis, a former member 
of a town's volunteer fire department brought a civil rights 
action against the fire department chief and members of the 
department's executive committee, alleging that his suspension 
and dismissal violated constitutional guarantees of free 
speech and due process. The district court dismissed the 
complaint, holding that there was no state action; moreover, 
even if there was state action, dismissal of the fireman 
did not violate First Amendment guarantees. Janusaitis v. 
Middlebury Volunteer Fire Department, 464 F. Supp. 288 (D.C. 
Conn. 1979). Upon appeal, the Secon9 Circuit affirmed the 
district court on the latter ground; however, the Court of 
Appeals held that the actions of the volunteer fire department 
in dismissing the fireman constituted state action and could 
offend the First Amendment. 
The Second Circuit relied upon Holodnak and Burton in 
finding the presence of a "symbiotic relationship" between 
the Town of Middlebury and the volunteer fire department. 
The fire department used land, buildings and fire fighting 
-7-
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equipment owned by the town; moreover, the town had a distinct 
interest in providing protection from fires. Likewise, Cen-
tral Waterworks' assets, including water rights, are owned 
by the State of Utah. In addition, the Department of Water 
Resources has a statutory mandate to insure the conservation 
and efficient use of the State's water supply. 
State action is present when the sifting of facts and 
weighing of circumstances reveals a special relationship 
between the State and a private party. In the instant case, 
the Department of Water Resources and Central Waterworks 
have combined their efforts to promote the efficient use of 
Utah's water resources. While Central may have purely sel-
fish interests at heart, the State's involvement comes only 
at the direction of the legislature to finance and take title 
to water projects which put the State-owned resource to its 
highest beneficial use. See Utah Cope Ann. §73-10-1 (7) (1953), 
Since the State owns all waters of the State, Utah Code Ann. 
§73-1-1 (1953), subject to beneficial use, Utah Code Ann. 
§73-1-3( 1953), the State benefits directly by financing pro-
jects which conserve the resource. The interests and acts 
of the State and Central are so "intertwined that the State 
must be recognized as 'a joint participant in the challe~~ 
activity. ' Burton, supra, 365 U.S. at 725, 6 L.Ed.2d 
at 52, 81 S.Ct. at 862." Janusaitis, supra, 607 F.2d at 23. 
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since a symbiotic relationship is present, the State 
and Central Waterworks are required to administer the water 
system in conformance with the Constitutions of the State 
cf Utah and the United States. 
B. State Action Is Present in Central 
Waterworks' Performance of a Tradi-
tionally Governmental Function. 
The Articles of Incorporation of Central Waterworks 
Company state that one of the purposes for which the corpora-
tion was organized was the "distribution of water to the 
inhabitants and citizens of the Town'of Central, Sevier County, 
State of Utah, and users nearby or within a short distance of 
said town." (R. p. 55). The distribution of water is tradi-
tionally a governmental function; however, in some cases, 
areas without appropriate subdivisions of government may rely 
upon private corporations for their water. While the entity 
providing water service may be a private corporation or per-
son; nevertheless, the service provided remains traditionally 
governmental in character. This is particularly the case 
where the private entity is, at least fiscally, a creature of 
the state. 
In Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Company, 419 U.S. 
345, 352, 42 L.Ed.2d 477, 485, 95 s.ct. 449, 454 (1974), the 
court recognized that there could be "state action present 
in the exercise by a private entity of powers traditionally 
-9-
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exclusively reserved to the state.° For example, in~ 
~Alabama, 326 u.s. 501, 90 L.Ed. 265, 66 s.ct. 275 (1946), 
the Supreme Court held that a Jehovah's Witness could not be 
prosecuted by the state for trespassing while distributing 
religious literature on the streets of a company town. The 
company town in Marsh had all the attributes of a munici-
pality, with the exception that title to the property was 
vested in a private corporation. The court, noting that the 
state should not permit a corporation to govern a community 
of citizens so as to restrict their fundamental liberties, 
held that the more a private party resembles and acts like a 
governmental entity, the more likely an inference of state 
action will be drawn. In short, Marsh held that a private 
party could be subject to constitutional restrictions in the 
exercise of traditionally governmental activities. 
Here, Central Waterworks has developed a monopoly on 
the delivery of water in the area. Furthermore, Central, 
with the encouragement and blessing of the State Department 
of Water Resources, has defended its exclusivity by protest-
ing a well application by plaintiffs on their property. 
Finally, Central Waterworks has imposed a thinly veiled zoning 
regulation under its "one connection one acre 0 rule. Under 
the rule of Marsh, Central Waterworks has effectively aban-
doned its claim to immunity under the Fourteenth Amendment. 
-10-
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see also Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 15 L.Ed.2d 373, 86 
s.ct. 486 (1966). 
In Janusaitis v. Middlebury Volunteer Fire Department, 
~~a, the Second Circuit held that fire protection is a 
governmental activity and subject to constitutional limita-
tions. Consequently, the actions of the volunteer fire depart-
ment in dismissing the fireman could offend the First Amend-
ment even though the municipality took no active part in 
the dismissal. In short, it is well established that the 
acts of a private entity may be state action solely because 
of the business or activity which the private entity pursues. 
POINT II 
RELIEF MAY BE GRANTED AGAINST CENTRAL 
WATERWORKS FOR VIOLATIONS OF APPELLANTS' 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS. 
As previously noted, the categorization of Central Water-
works as a "private" corporation does not insulate the com-
pany from the Constitution. In addition, the word "private" 
does not prevent the court from granting appropriate relief 
to the appellants. Where a finding of state action is made, 
it is clearly appropriate for remedial measures to be directed 
toward the private party as well as the state. Burton v. 
Wilmington Parking Authority, supra. Otherwise, "the diffi-
culty of separating private from governmental action for 
remedial purposes would often preclude any effective relief." 
-11-
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Holodnak v. Avco Corporation, 514 F.2d 285, 292 (2d Cir. 
1975). 
The Second Circuit also noted in Holodnak, that: 
It goes without saying, where a nominally 
private party has been allow~d to exercise 
powers traditionally reserved to the govern-
ment itself, it will no longer be treated for 
remedial purposes as a 'private party.' See, 
~,Marsh v. Alabama, 327 U.S. 501, 66 ~Ct. 
276, 90 L. Ed. 265 ( 1946) (company town); 
Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 86 s. Ct. 486, 
15 L. Ed.2d 373 (1966)(municipal park). 
Holodnak, supra, at 292 n. 7. In short, relief may be granted 
to the appellants against both Central Waterworks and the 
State of Utah regardless of which version of state action, 
or combination thereof, is found to exist. Regardless of 
whether state action stems from a symbiotic relationship 
between Central Waterworks and the State of Utah or from 
the fact that Central Waterworks performs a traditionally 
governmental function, the court may require that the assets 
of Central Waterworks be administered with due regard to 
appellants' constitutional rights. 
CONCLUSION 
Central Waterworks' denial of water connections to the 
appellants is State action within the purview and protection 
of either the Utah or United States Constitutions. The syr 
biotic relationship between the respondents, characterized 
by the mutual benefits conferred by the venture and State 
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ownership of Central's assets, gives rise to state action 
in the arbitrary and capricious acts of Central. Further-
more, Central, in performance of a traditionally governmental 
fur.ct ion, has shed the cloak of immunity normally retained 
by a private entity. Finally, the Court may grant appellants 
relief as against both respondents, even though Central is 
nominally a private entity. 
In view of the fact that the apppellants have stated a 
cause of action upon which relief may be granted, the judg-
ments of the lower court should be reversed and the matter 
remanded to the District Court. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
By ~a.~ 
GeorgeA: Hunt 1cJ- t3 I) P 
By ~ki2T B~. Panzer 
Attorneys for A:PelantS 
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